diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssh/files/patch-an')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssh/files/patch-an | 49 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssh/files/patch-an b/security/openssh/files/patch-an index c102d36b7dcb..2c39339acaa0 100644 --- a/security/openssh/files/patch-an +++ b/security/openssh/files/patch-an @@ -1,14 +1,15 @@ ---- /usr/ports/distfiles/OpenSSH-1.2/src/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c Sun Nov 28 16:50:26 1999 -+++ sshd.c Mon Dec 6 00:54:51 1999 -@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ +--- sshd.c.orig Tue Dec 7 22:56:55 1999 ++++ sshd.c Tue Dec 7 22:58:36 1999 +@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" ++#include <poll.h> +#include <time.h> #ifdef LIBWRAP #include <tcpd.h> -@@ -32,6 +33,16 @@ +@@ -32,6 +34,16 @@ int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; #endif /* LIBWRAP */ @@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif -@@ -118,6 +129,32 @@ +@@ -118,6 +130,32 @@ the private key. */ RSA *public_key; @@ -58,15 +59,15 @@ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void do_connection(); void do_authentication(char *user); -@@ -278,6 +315,7 @@ +@@ -278,6 +316,7 @@ extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int opt, aux, sock_in, sock_out, newsock, i, pid, on = 1; + int connections_per_period_exceeded = 0; int remote_major, remote_minor; int silentrsa = 0; - struct sockaddr_in sin; -@@ -542,6 +580,12 @@ + struct pollfd fds; +@@ -543,6 +582,12 @@ /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ /* * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or * the daemon is killed with a signal. -@@ -560,9 +604,31 @@ +@@ -572,9 +617,31 @@ error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } @@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ */ if (debug_flag) { /* -@@ -576,6 +642,12 @@ +@@ -588,6 +655,12 @@ sock_out = newsock; pid = getpid(); break; @@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ } else { /* * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have -@@ -1048,6 +1120,14 @@ +@@ -1065,6 +1138,14 @@ return 0; } } @@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ return 1; } -@@ -1083,6 +1163,9 @@ +@@ -1100,6 +1181,9 @@ pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); @@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ pw = &pwcopy; /* -@@ -1871,6 +1954,10 @@ +@@ -1889,6 +1973,10 @@ struct sockaddr_in from; int fromlen; struct pty_cleanup_context cleanup_context; @@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ /* Get remote host name. */ hostname = get_canonical_hostname(); -@@ -1935,6 +2022,12 @@ +@@ -1953,6 +2041,12 @@ /* Check if .hushlogin exists. */ snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); quiet_login = stat(line, &st) >= 0; @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ /* * If the user has logged in before, display the time of last -@@ -1958,6 +2051,20 @@ +@@ -1976,6 +2070,20 @@ else printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, buf); } @@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ /* * Print /etc/motd unless a command was specified or printing * it was disabled in server options or login(1) will be -@@ -1966,14 +2073,22 @@ +@@ -1984,14 +2092,22 @@ */ if (command == NULL && options.print_motd && !quiet_login && !options.use_login) { @@ -220,7 +221,7 @@ /* Do common processing for the child, such as execing the command. */ do_child(command, pw, term, display, auth_proto, auth_data, ttyname); /* NOTREACHED */ -@@ -2109,7 +2224,8 @@ +@@ -2127,7 +2243,8 @@ const char *display, const char *auth_proto, const char *auth_data, const char *ttyname) { @@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ char buf[256]; FILE *f; unsigned int envsize, i; -@@ -2117,15 +2233,34 @@ +@@ -2135,15 +2252,34 @@ extern char **environ; struct stat st; char *argv[10]; @@ -270,7 +271,7 @@ } /* Set login name in the kernel. */ if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) -@@ -2135,6 +2270,13 @@ +@@ -2153,6 +2289,13 @@ /* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ if (!options.use_login) { @@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("setgid"); -@@ -2157,7 +2299,14 @@ +@@ -2175,7 +2318,14 @@ * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ @@ -299,7 +300,7 @@ #ifdef AFS /* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */ -@@ -2181,7 +2330,12 @@ +@@ -2199,7 +2349,12 @@ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); @@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); -@@ -2271,6 +2425,9 @@ +@@ -2289,6 +2444,9 @@ */ endpwent(); endhostent(); @@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ /* * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don\'t have them -@@ -2278,7 +2435,7 @@ +@@ -2296,7 +2454,7 @@ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file * descriptors open. */ @@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ close(i); /* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */ -@@ -2297,6 +2454,26 @@ +@@ -2315,6 +2473,26 @@ * in this order). */ if (!options.use_login) { |